Modern Technologies in the Geopolitical Strategies of the United States and China in the Post-Cold War World

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran

10.22099/ijas.2025.53221.1037

Abstract

Introduction
In the post–Cold War era, the emergence and diffusion of transformative technologies derived from the Fourth Industrial Revolution—such as artificial intelligence, big data, the Internet of Things, 5G networks, quantum computing, and biotechnology—have fundamentally reshaped the nature of competition among major powers. Technology has evolved from a tool of economic development into a strategic instrument for shaping the global balance of power, determining the trajectory of world order, and redefining the concept of national security. Among global actors, the United States and China have become the two principal competitors in this multidimensional, complex technological arena. Since the late 2010s, particularly during the Trump administration, this rivalry has transcended the economic and commercial spheres, acquiring a distinctly geopolitical character. The key dimensions of this competition include control over global supply chains, dominance in advanced technologies, standard-setting, intellectual property governance, data security, and cyber sovereignty. In this context, technological-geopolitical rivalry has replaced traditional great-power competition and now shapes the emerging configuration of the international system. This study aims to analyse the geopolitical dimensions and implications of the U.S.–China technological rivalry in the twenty-first century. The main research question asks: What strategies have the United States and China adopted to achieve leadership in key emerging technologies, and how is this rivalry redefining the post–Cold War international order? The study hypothesises that both powers are pursuing a structural rivalry across technological networks of infrastructure and production, rooted in divergent interpretations of strategic stability and reinforced by mutual mistrust and competing geopolitical interests.
 
Methods
This research employs a descriptive–analytical methodology with a qualitative approach. Data were collected through content analysis of official policy documents and strategic papers. The primary sources include the U.S. National Security and Technology Strategies (2017 and 2022), the CHIPS and Science Act, and China’s major innovation frameworks such as Made in China 2025, the Digital Silk Road Initiative, and Vision 2035. The analysis focuses on comparative patterns of technological governance, industrial policy, state-led innovation models, investment structures in digital infrastructure, and data security management. To ensure validity and reliability, conceptual triangulation was employed by cross-referencing official documents with analytical reports from international research institutions, including RAND, CSIS, the Brookings Institution, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. This approach enabled a more comprehensive understanding of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the technological rivalry between the two powers.
 
Findings
The findings indicate that the technological rivalry between the United States and China is multilayered, structural, and geopolitical, and continues to deepen. At the infrastructural level, the United States seeks to consolidate technological alliances with its partners through initiatives such as the Alliance for Democratic Technologies, aiming to restrict China’s access to critical technologies, including semiconductors, advanced artificial intelligence, and quantum innovations. Washington’s objective is to preserve its technological superiority and prevent the diffusion of strategically sensitive know-how to its geopolitical competitor. Conversely, China pursues a model of indigenous technological self-reliance through massive state investments in core sectors such as microchips, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure. By combining elements of state capitalism with market-driven innovation, Beijing aims to reduce dependence on Western technologies and expand its technological influence in surrounding regions, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At the strategic level, technology has become central to deterrence policy, next-generation arms competition, and soft power projection. The United States perceives technology as a key instrument for maintaining its geopolitical primacy and preventing the emergence of a multipolar order, whereas China views it as a path toward establishing itself as an equal global power and a founder of a more equitable international system. Politically and economically, both nations exhibit a strong sense of technonationalism, resulting in increasingly protectionist and restrictive policies in technology trade, export control, and standard-setting. The consequences of this trend include growing divergence in global technological standards, the formation of rival technological blocs, disruption of global supply chains, and the escalation of cyber and digital insecurities.
Nevertheless, the findings also suggest that despite intense competition, there remain limited but significant opportunities for conditional cooperation in areas of shared global concern. Domains such as climate change, global health, food security, and the development of responsible artificial intelligence frameworks can serve as platforms for cautious, trust-building engagement between the two powers.
 
Conclusion
The study concludes that the U.S.–China technological rivalry has become one of the defining axes of global geopolitics in the post–Cold War era. This rivalry is not merely economic in nature but part of a broader process of redefining power, security, and the architecture of the international order. Its implications extend across multiple dimensions—from the digital economy and global innovation systems to security governance and cultural interaction. Persistent mistrust and rising technonationalism threaten to divide the global technological ecosystem into competing blocs, increase the costs of innovation, and weaken international governance mechanisms in the technology domain. Therefore, establishing technological confidence-building mechanisms, promoting transparency in data regulation, expanding technology diplomacy, and creating multilateral institutions for international technology governance are essential steps toward mitigating tensions and strengthening strategic stability in the evolving global order.

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Main Subjects


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