Document Type : Original Article
Author
PhD Student, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Abstract
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine Iran’s strategic turn toward Southeast Asia during the years 1997–2005; a strategic turn that has, over time, been forgotten in the historical memory of Iranian foreign policy. The present study seeks to answer the question of why and how Iran, during this period, attempted to elevate its relations with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from the level of scattered interactions to a more sustained and partially institutionalized presence, and why this process ultimately did not lead to full institutionalization. ASEAN, owing to its central role in the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific and the growing economic standing of its member states, has become one of the most important regional partners for countries outside Southeast Asia. For this reason, many states seek to develop institutional relations with ASEAN and participate in its affiliated mechanisms. Examining Iran’s previous experiences in engaging with ASEAN can play an important role in identifying the opportunities, constraints, and institutional requirements necessary for the success of Iran’s future efforts to develop relations with this organization.
Methods
This study employs a historical-analytical method and process tracing to examine the evolution of Iran–ASEAN relations and the factors influencing the advances and setbacks in these relations. Data were collected from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, reports of Iranian diplomatic missions in Southeast Asian countries, documents and reports of the ASEAN Secretariat, and the national archives of countries in the region. Secondary sources include scholarly works, research reports, documents of international organizations, and Persian- and English-language media sources. In order to enhance the reliability of the findings, the data were evaluated through the comparison and cross-verification of different sources.
Findings
In summary, following the start of ASEAN's enlargement process in the early 1990s and the resolution of the Cambodian crisis, Iran capitalized on the emerging opportunity and presented the leaders of Southeast Asian countries with a comprehensive framework for economic cooperation. The principal objective of this framework was to secure a long-term Iranian presence in the development and utilization of energy and transit infrastructure in Southeast Asia. In return, Iran would itself become a gateway through which ASEAN countries could gain easier access to the economies and fossil fuel markets of Central Asia.
The findings of the study indicate that, alongside economic and geopolitical opportunities, a set of institutional and political obstacles—including the consequences of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis and its impact on domestic instability in regional states, ASEAN’s institutional constraints on the admission of new partners, and external pressures associated with U.S. sanctions—contributed to the slowing or suspension of a number of initiatives. Nevertheless, during this period Iran succeeded in addressing many of the ASEAN leadership’s earlier concerns regarding the country. These included reducing concerns about the export of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, continuing religious activities within frameworks acceptable to ASEAN governments, redefining its policy toward Muslim separatist movements in the region on the basis of the principle of non-interference, cooperating in the field of counter-narcotics, and emphasizing its commitment to ASEAN’s fundamental principles, including respect for national sovereignty and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Conclusion
The present study argues that the totality of Iran’s proposed projects vis-à-vis ASEAN during this period should be viewed as a single strategic-corridor framework. Examining these projects individually and on a country-by-country basis obscures the broader picture and weakens a holistic understanding of the history of Iran–ASEAN relations. A reappraisal of this period demonstrates the complex and long-term effort undertaken by Iran’s foreign policy establishment to engage with the growing economic and political potential of East and Southeast Asia. The findings further suggest that Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated the process of “Asianization,” or the “Look East” policy, in Iranian foreign policy by the late 1990s, with Southeast Asia regarded as an important destination for expanding Iran’s engagement with Asia. Had Iran–ASEAN relations not been disrupted by domestic crises within ASEAN member states and, subsequently, by the securitization of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program, and had the Iran–ASEAN strategic corridor entered its operational phase, it might have attained a strategic significance not substantially less than that of China’s Maritime Silk Road.
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