Document Type : ٍEnglish Articles
Author
Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
Abstract
Introduction
This article examines India’s civilizational diplomacy as a symbolic and normative dimension of Asian order-making. It asks how religious-civilizational resources are translated into diplomatic language, soft-power potential, and claims of moral participation in regional and global order. The article focuses on three cases: Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam during India’s 2023 G20 presidency, Buddhist diplomacy toward Asia, and yoga diplomacy as global public diplomacy. The central argument is that India does not simply export religion, nor does religion determine Indian foreign policy. Rather, selected religious-cultural resources are recoded into broadly accessible vocabularies of planetary responsibility, peace, heritage, health, and connectivity. Their political significance depends on institutional uptake, audience reception, domestic credibility, and geopolitical context.
Methods
The article uses a qualitative interpretive design. It analyzes official Indian and multilateral texts, including G20 documents, United Nations material on the International Day of Yoga, Ministry of AYUSH material, Press Information Bureau releases on Buddhist summits, parliamentary material on India’s Buddhist diplomacy, and sources related to the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation framework. These are read alongside scholarly literature on soft power, public diplomacy, civilizational exceptionalism, political theology, Hindu nationalism, secularism, and India’s foreign policy. The method distinguishes among four levels of evidence: state projection, institutional uptake, limited regional engagement, and measurable soft-power effect. The article claims the first three where evidence permits, but does not claim demonstrated foreign-policy influence or durable audience reception without independent evidence.
Results and discussion
The analysis finds that India’s civilizational diplomacy operates through translation rather than direct religious export. In the G20 case, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam was officially linked to a Sanskrit and Upanishadic source, but it was reframed as a universal language of planetary interdependence and shared responsibility. Its incorporation into the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration shows institutional uptake of India’s civilizational vocabulary in a multilateral setting. However, this evidence does not prove that external audiences accepted India’s civilizational self-presentation or that the slogan produced measurable diplomatic influence. The yoga case shows a different pathway. Yoga was internationalized through the language of health, harmony, balance, and well-being. The International Day of Yoga demonstrates institutional recognition and global public visibility. Yet yoga’s global recognition should not be treated as proof of foreign-policy alignment or durable attraction. It is better understood as a soft-power resource whose political effects depend on reception and credibility. Buddhist diplomacy provides the clearest link to symbolic and normative participation in Asian order-making. Buddhist memory connects India to sacred geography, pilgrimage circuits, Nalanda, Buddhist heritage, Southeast Asia, and wider debates over Asian connectivity. The Global Buddhist Summit and Asian Buddhist Summit framed Buddhist thought in relation to peace, sustainability, heritage, and Asia’s moral-cultural connections. The Bodhi Yatra and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation framework further show how Buddhist circuits, tourism, cultural exchange, and Southeast Asian outreach are linked to India’s regional diplomatic repertoire. These initiatives demonstrate regional linkage and institutionalized cultural engagement, not durable influence. They also operate within a competitive Asian environment, especially in relation to China’s own Buddhist diplomacy and heritage politics.
The article also finds that civilizational diplomacy is conditioned by domestic credibility. India’s external projection of plurality, spiritual heritage, Buddhist peace, and civilizational universalism is interpreted against debates over constitutional secularism, Hindu nationalism, minority belonging, and the politics of national identity. This does not invalidate civilizational diplomacy, but it limits any automatic equation between cultural projection and soft-power success. Political theology helps clarify this process by showing how sacred or quasi-sacred memory becomes available for claims about moral authority, legitimacy, responsibility, and order, while remaining mediated by institutions, audiences, and contestation. Accordingly, the article treats Asian order-making as discursive positioning, institutional uptake, regional linkage, and symbolic competition rather than formal regional leadership or material control of Asia.
Conclusions
India’s civilizational diplomacy is best understood as a field between rhetoric and demonstrable influence. It gives India a language and institutional repertoire for symbolic participation in Asian and global order-making, but it does not by itself establish normative leadership or measurable soft-power success. Its effectiveness depends on institutional mediation, regional reception, geopolitical competition, and the credibility of India’s domestic pluralist claims.
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