دریای سرخ و نظم امنیتی آسیا: واکاوی راهبردهای ژئوپلیتیکی قدرت‌های منطقه‌ای

Introduction
The Red Sea, stretching approximately 2,250 kilometers from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is a critical maritime artery facilitating over 10% of global trade and 30% of container shipping. However, chronic instability of the coastal states, the activities of armed non-state actors, and the intensifying rivalries among regional and extra-regional powers have deeply challenged the security of this maritime space. What makes this waterway particularly significant for regional studies in West Asia is the inextricable link between developments in the Red Sea and the security order of this part of Asia; for the strategic chokepoints of Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal are not only critical passageways for the Red Sea littoral states but also the main arteries of trade and energy for many West Asian countries (including the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and even Israel). Geopolitically, the Red Sea borders eight unstable countries and witnesses interstate rivalries, external interventions, and non-state actors such as the Houthis. Geoeconomically, it hosts underwater fiber-optic cables carrying 99% of Europe-Asia data traffic. Great power competition (the US, China, Russia, India, Turkey) has further militarized the area. Regional powers—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Ethiopia—each based on their position and resources, view the Red Sea through the lens of national security and economic diversification, often pursuing zero-sum strategies. This study seeks to answer how the Red Sea’s geopolitical status has influenced the security strategies of regional powers and what implications these strategies have for the security order of West Asia.
Methods
This study adopted a qualitative research methodology with a descriptive-analytical approach. Data collection relied on documentary analysis from reputable Persian and English sources. Persian materials included reports from Iranian think tanks (e.g., the Institute for International Energy Studies and the National Security Research Institute) and academic journals (e.g., Strategic Studies Quarterly and Journal of Defense Policy). English sources comprised publications from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Arab Center Washington DC, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Israel, and peer-reviewed articles from ScienceDirect and Taylor & Francis. Additional open-access reports from the Emirates Policy Center and the Orion Policy Institute ensured balanced representation of Western, Arab, African, and Iranian viewpoints. Sources were selected based on credibility, recency (post-2020), and geographical diversity to avoid bias. Data were thematically coded to identify patterns in security strategies, including power balancing, proxy involvement, and multilateral initiatives. Ethical considerations included cross-verification of facts to mitigate misinformation.
Findings
The analysis revealed that the geostrategic and geoeconomic prominence of the Red Sea has compelled regional powers to pursue competitive security strategies rooted in power balancing. Key actors, each based on its position and resources, pursue strategies centered on controlling strategic chokepoints (Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal), creating strategic depth, securing trade and energy supply chains, containing regional rivals, and exploiting the power vacuum caused by the weakness of coastal states. Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Yemen war (since 2015) aimed to counter Houthi advances and secure its southern borders, but it exacerbated instability and provoked retaliatory Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb. Since late 2023, these attacks have disrupted global trade, forced rerouting around Africa, and increased transportation costs by up to 40%. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s pursuit of independent sea access through an agreement with Somalia’s autonomous region of Somaliland heightened diplomatic and military tensions with the Somali federal government as well as with Egypt (due to concerns over Ethiopian control of Nile waters). Egypt, reliant on approximately $9 billion in annual Suez Canal revenues, faces not only the threat of reduced maritime transit but also the spillover of Sudan’s civil war along its southern borders. The United Arab Emirates, through extensive port investments in Berbera (Somaliland) and Assab (Eritrea), seeks to establish a permanent military-commercial presence on the African shore of the Red Sea while countering Qatari and Turkish influence. Non-state actors, particularly the Houthi movement, have severely undermined waterway security through asymmetric warfare (ballistic missiles, suicide drones, and naval mines), prompting the formation of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. The involvement of extra-regional great powers (China’s military base in Djibouti, Russia’s aspirations for a naval base in Sudan, and the growing influence of Turkey and India) has further added to the complexity and instability of the region’s security environment. Collective mechanisms such as the Red Sea Council (comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Somalia) and the EU’s Operation ASPIDES have failed to establish a stable security order due to geopolitical rivalries, mutual mistrust, and lack of political will.
Conclusion
The geopolitical centrality of the Red Sea has entrenched competitive security strategies among regional powers. Although these strategies have, in the short term, somewhat enhanced deterrence capacity and regional influence for each actor, in the long term they have reproduced insecurity, increased maritime transportation costs, disrupted global supply chains, and undermined any mechanism for collective cooperation in West Asia. Local conflicts (Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa), non-state threats (especially the Houthis), and rivalries among great and regional powers have rendered any multilateral cooperation ineffective. Global ramifications include disruptions to maritime trade, rising energy prices, and vulnerability of cross-border communication infrastructure (fiber-optic cables). To overcome this situation, regional actors must prioritize preventive diplomacy and inclusive forums (with the participation of all coastal states, including Ethiopia and Iran) and focus on confidence-building mechanisms and the management of common interests rather than zero-sum games. Without such structural shifts, the Red Sea risks remaining a perpetual flashpoint, underscoring the urgent need for balanced, inclusive, and multilateral approaches.