نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشگاه فرماندهی و ستاد ارتش
3 گروه ژئوپلیتیک دانشگاه فرماندهی و ستاد اجا
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction:
With the end of the Mao era and the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China gradually expanded its economic presence in West Asia. By adopting the strategy of “hiding capabilities and biding time,” Deng sought to lay the foundations for China’s long‑term influence without becoming involved in political tensions. This trend continued under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and ultimately led, in the Xi Jinping era, to the emergence of a “strategic balancing” approach.
Within this framework, China faces a complex situation in the Tehran–Beijing–Tel Aviv triangle: on the one hand, its strategic relations with Iran in the field of energy and certain military cooperation have persisted; on the other hand, technological and economic cooperation with Israel has also continued. However, Operation Al‑Aqsa Storm and the subsequent 12‑day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025 put this balance under pressure and raised a question in Israel as to whether China still adheres to the model of strategic balance or is redefining Iran as a strategic partner in its competition with the United States. Accordingly, the fundamental question is whether, following these recent developments, China has altered its traditional strategy of strategic balancing, or whether it remains within its previous framework and has merely adjusted its behaviour at the tactical level.
The authors’ hypothesis is that, in the triangular relations between China, Israel, and Iran, Beijing’s previous strategic pattern of “cooperation–conflict” has shifted, after the October war, towards a pattern of “conflict–relative conflict.” Despite certain costs, this shift has created favourable opportunities for China to increase its synergy with Iran and the Arab world as its main energy suppliers.
Method:
This study employs game theory, the “prisoner’s dilemma” model, and Gambit software to analyse the mechanisms of conflict and cooperation among actors under conditions of uncertainty. By scoring the data and calculating Nash equilibria (pure and mixed), strategic scenarios are simulated so that the consequences of decisions and prevailing behavioural patterns can be explained with greater precision.
Findings:
Historically, relations between China and Israel have rested on several key pillars that are essential for understanding the current dynamics between these two actors. The first pillar concerns the historical ties between Jewish communities and Chinese society. The second relates to bilateral cooperation in new technologies and modernization. China’s perception of its historical vulnerability, together with its efforts to pursue a survival‑and‑development strategy under the “Made in China 2025” initiative, pushed Beijing to capitalize on Israel’s capacities in research and development and advanced technologies. This vital need laid the basis for the third pillar, namely the expansion of bilateral investment. The entry of major Chinese companies into large‑scale infrastructure projects, alongside investment in agricultural sectors and start‑ups, reflects this growing linkage. Building on this economic convergence, a fourth pillar emerged with a sharp increase in academic and scientific cooperation, exemplified by the establishment of joint university campuses in China and the creation of bilateral research funds.
However, China’s broader strategy in the Middle East also contains other dimensions that reproduce its diplomacy as a “cooperation–conflict” policy. The fifth pillar is defined in the shadow of China’s strategic cooperation with Iran. Finally, the sixth pillar pertains to China’s support for Palestine within the broader narrative of the “Global South.” Public opinion data in the Arab world indicate that this approach has enhanced China’s status and paved the way for deeper financial and energy relations with Arab states. In this way, China seeks to preserve its technological ties with Israel while simultaneously expanding its geopolitical influence in competition with the West.
Conclusion:
After the events of 7 October, Israel’s perception of China’s neutrality was undermined, and despite Beijing’s diplomatic efforts to maintain economic relations, bilateral ties cooled. Game‑theoretical analysis shows that although the “cooperation–cooperation” scenario is the most desirable outcome for both sides, Israel’s structural dependence on the United States and the changing balance of power in the region have compelled China to revise its previous strategy. Consequently, Beijing, by prioritizing its geoeconomic and strategic interests, has moved towards strengthening and consolidating its relations with Iran, a development that is pushing China–Israel relations towards a “conflict–conflict” situation.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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